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Is ENDA the Answer?
Can a "Separate but Equal" Federal Statute
Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from
Employment Discrimination?
J. BANNING JASIUNAS*
Some state and local governments have enacted anti-discrimination laws
that protect gays and lesbians from discrimination in employment, but there
is no federal legislation that currently addresses this issue. The Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) seeks to remedy this by extending federal
anti-discrimination protection to gays and lesbians under a framework
similar to that used in Title VII. This note argues that ENDA s protection to
gays and lesbians will be less than the protection offered to other protected
groups under Title VII for two reasons. First, ENDA includes numerous
exceptions that narrow the scope of the prohibition on sexual orientation
discrimination. Second, by addressing sexual orientation in a stand-alone
statute, Congress encourages the courts to construe ENDA 's scope more
narrowly than that of Title VII and to refuse to extend interpretive theories
developed under Title VII to sexual orientation discrimination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is common in the American
workplace.' A recent public survey found that eighty-three percent of Americans
believe that homosexuals and bisexuals should be protected from discrimination
in employment.2 In the 2000 presidential primary election, Democratic hopeful
* Special thanks to Professors David Goldberger, Ruth Colker, and Camille HWbert
for their help in the development of this note. I dedicate this note to my family and
friends for their unwavering support.
I Surveys have found that between sixteen percent and forty-six percent of gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals have experienced some form of employment discrimination based on their sexual
orientation. M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 726, 728 (1995). Some forms of this discrimination include failure to
hire, immediate termination, "glass ceiling" limits on promotions, harassment, and unequal
benefits. David A. Landau, Note, Employment Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gays: The
Incomplete Legal Responses of the United States and the European Union, 4 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 335, 338-40 (1994). The stakes for preventing such discrimination are high "because
of the impact anti-gay discrimination has on the ability of lesbians and gay men to exercise yet
otherrights guaranteed to all Americans" Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard
in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHIcs & PuB. POL'Y
137, 159 (1995).
2 John Leland, Shades of Gay, NEWsWEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, at 46, 48. This figure is up
from fifty-six percent in a 1977 survey. lId Domestic partnership benefits are still controversial;
fifty-eight percent think partners are entitled to health insurance, and fifty-four percent think
partners are entitled to Social Security. Id. at 49.
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Bill Bradley attracted considerable attention from the gay press when he
announced that he thought the best way to protect sexual oientation was to add it
to the categories protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 In
contrast to Bradley, his challenger, Vice-President Al Gore, supported the
enactment of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).4 Both
Democratic candidates purported to be seeking a federal answer to the continuing
national problem of sexual orientation discrimination,5 but could not agree on the
best policy. This note addresses the question of whether it is possible to
adequately protect gay and lesbian employees from discrimination through a
stand-alone statutory scheme like ENDA.
Part II of this note reviews the current law surrounding sexual orientation
discrimination in employment. It looks at state and local anti-discrimination laws
and why these laws are less effective than federal legislation would be. This Part
also looks at the decisions of federal courts, which have refused to extend Title
VII to sexual orientation, but have recently begun to find that gays and lesbians
might be protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part III then examines the specific protection offered under ENDA,
as well as the numerous exceptions to ENDA. This Part then analyzes the
possible court interpretations of ENDA, and suggests that the protection offered
by ENDA will be far different and inferior to that of Title VII. This note
concludes that ENDA's proposed "separate but equal" treatment of sexual
orientation is far from equal to Title VII's protections.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAw
A. Anti-Discrimination Legislation
1. Local and Municipal Ordinances
In 1972, East Lansing, Michigan, became the first jurisdiction to prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination in employment.6 Over the last three decades,
over 150 cities and 35 counties in the United States have joined East Lansing and
enacted laws that to some extent prohibit discrimination in employment on the
3 Chris Bull, Bill Bradley Wants You!, ADVOCATE, Oct. 12, 1999, at 26, 31. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
4 See Bull, supra note 3 at 26, 31. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S.1276, 106th
Cong. (1999).
5 See Chuck Colbert, Gays Poised as Key Voters in Presidential Race, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Mar. 4, 2000, at A7 (noting the "shining path of support" to gay civil rights offered by
both candidates).
6 See LYNNE YAMAGUCHI FLETCHER, THE FIRST GAY POPE 77 (1992).
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basis of sexual orientation. 7 As is to be expected, these ordinances vary greatly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.8 This variance can cause problems, as it makes it
difficult for employers who operate in more than one city to adopt uniform
policies.9
When these ordinances have come under challenge, courts have not treated
them uniformly. Some state courts have upheld and expressly approved of these
local laws. 10 Other courts have struck down local anti-discrimination ordinances
as outside the legislative power of the municipality 1 or preempted by state law.12
At least one court has held that a local ordinance is insufficient to support tort
claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.13 There is some
evidence to suggest that the enforcement of these local ordinances is lacking.14
7 See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, Summary of States, Cities, and
Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, at
http//www.lambdalegal.orgcgi-bin/pages/documents/recordrecord=217 (Oct. 25, 1999)
[hereinafter Summary] (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
8 Many counties and cities ban sexual orientation discrimination only in public
employment; others extend protection to private employment and public accommodations. See
id Some local laws extend even further. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. ADMIN. CODE Chap.
12B (1998) (barring the city from contracting with any companies that discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation).
9 See Chad A. Readier, Note, Local Government Anti-Discrimination Laws: Do They
Make a Difference?, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 777, 790 (1998) ("Although local ordinances
reflect the shared values of their communities, they have created a number of inconsistencies in
enforcement from town to town and state to state, placing inconsistent demands upon
employers with offices in more than one locality.").
10 See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (N.D.
Calif. 1998) (holding that an ordinance which prohibited the city from contracting with
companies that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation with regard to benefits was a
valid exercise of municipal power and was not preempted by state law); Kahn v. Thompson,
916 P.2d 1124, 1127, 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding a ban on sexual orientation
discrimination against a free association claim).
II See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(invalidating a city ordinance that granted health care benefits to same sex partners of city
employees on the grounds that the issue of same-sex partner benefits was a statewide issue).
12 See, eg., Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 35-37 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that a city ban on sexual orientation discrimination was preempted by a state ban
on sexual orientation discrimination).
13See Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1031-34 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (noting that a local ordinance prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination is not
sufficiently clear public policy to establish tort of wrongful discharge). But c. Overholtzer v.
W. Contra Costa Sch. Dist, No. A080225 (Cal. Ct App. 1999) (holding that plaintiff,
constructively discharged after coming out as a lesbian, who did not file administrative appeals
required under state anti-discrimination law nevertheless established tort of wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy).
14 See Readier, supra note 9, at 796-805 (suggesting that local ordinances prohibiting
types of discrimination that are not covered under federal law are ineffective because claims are
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One significant problem with local anti-discrimination laws is their political
instability. For example, the anti-discrimination ordinances enacted in Cincinnati,
Ohio, 15 were later invalidated by Issue 3, a ballot initiative that forbade the city or
any of its agencies from adopting any policy that offered anti-discrimination
protection based on sexual orientation. 16 Issue 3 was challenged on equal
protection and First Amendment grounds, 17 but the Sixth Circuit upheld it as
constitutional in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati18 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the
decision and remanded,19 but the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the constitutionality of
Issue 3.20 The Supreme Court refused to reconsider the case.21 As a practical
underreported, employers are unaware of the ordinances, and enforcement agencies are
underfunded and underqualified to handle the claims they do receive).
15 See CINCINNATI CITY ORD. No. 79-1991 (1991) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in city employment and appointment to city boards and commissions);
CINCINNATI CITY ORD. No. 490-1992 (1992) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in private employment, public accommodations, and housing).
16 See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F3d 261, 264
(6th Cir. 1995), vacatedby 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
17 The district court found that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals met the criteria for quasi-
suspect status. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994), overruled by Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated by 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). The court found that
Issue 3 implicated the fundamental right of access to the political process, and was not
rationally related to any legitimate govemmental purpose. See Equal Found., 860 F. Supp. at
432, 441. Issue 3 was also found to violate the First Amendment because it was
unconstitutionally vague and infringed on the plaintiff's rights to speech, association, and
petition. See id. at 447,449.
18 See Equal. Found, 54 F.3d at 270-271. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district
court's decision on all grounds. It found first that homosexuals did not constitute a quasi-
suspect class. Equal Found., 54 F.3d at 268. It then found that Issue 3 did not burden any
fundamental right of homosexuals. Id at 269. Finally, it held that no First Amendment rights
were obstructed by Issue 3. Id. at 269-70.
19 See Equal. Found, 518 U.S. at 1001. The Court remanded and vacated in consideration
of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See Equality Found., 518 U.S. at 1001. For a full
discussion of Romer v. Evans, see infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the order to vacate and remand, and suggested that
Issue 3 was distinguishable from the state constitutional amendment struck down in Romer
because it involved a decision by the "lowest electoral subunit." Equality Found, 518 U.S. at
1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20 See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300-
301 (6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit found that the Cincinnati ordinance was distinguishable
from the state amendment at issue in Romer because it applied only at the municipal level and
could not remove any state-granted rights, and it was narrowly construed to forbid "special
class status" rather than depriving homosexuals of all rights under municipal laws. See id at
296-97. The Sixth Circuit thus followed the reasoning suggested by Justice Scalia.
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effect of Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, citizens of a municipality
can affirmatively refuse to offer any discrimination protection to homosexuals.
Experience has also shown that anti-discrimination laws based on sexual
orientation are vulnerable to repeal.22
Given the lack of uniformity in the drafting of the laws, the contrary judicial
opinions interpreting them, and their questionable enforcement, many have
concluded that local regulation cannot be relied upon to adequately protect gays
and lesbians from discrimination in employment.2 3 The next section considers
state statutes as an alternative.
2. State Statutes
Wisconsin led the way for states passing laws that ban sexual orientation
discrimination in employment when it enacted a gay-rights law in 1982.24 Over
the next twenty-seven years, other states have followed suit, such that eleven
states and the District of Columbia now have statutes prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.2 5 Some states that lack a specific provision
barring sexual orientation discrimination in employment have "lifestyle protection
statutes" that may extend some protection to homosexuals.2 6 Additionally, in
21 See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998)
(mer.).
2 2 There is currently a petition drive in Dade County, Florida, to repeal a local ordinance
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in housing, employment, and public
accommodation. See Don Finefrock, Miami-Dade County, Florida, Allows Drive to Reverse
Law Banning Gay Bias, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 9, 2000, at A3. Dade County gained notoriety in
1977 as a result of the successful campaign to overturn a similar ordinance led by Anita Bryant.
See id.
23 See Ronnie Cohen et al., Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation:
The American, Canadian and U.K. Responses, 17 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 19-20 (1999) (noting that
the "patchwork" of protection offered under state and local ordinances is "seriously and
obviously deficient"); Landau, supra note 1, at 346-47 (asserting that the "localized approach"
creates a variety of problems); Readier, supra note 9, at 808 (noting the problem with local
governments losing the ability to enforce local law).
24 See WIS. STAT. §§ 111.19-111.36 (1996).
25 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-81c
(1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1999); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 368-1, 378-2 (1993); MASS.
GEN. LAWs ch. 151B, § 4 (1998); MINN. STAT. §§ 363.03, 363.12 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. 610.020, 613340 (Michie 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:7, :8 (Supp. 1999);
NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 10:2-1, :5-4, :5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-2,
28-5-7 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. § 11136 (1996). Maine
had enacted a similar law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment, but the
law was repealed by a statewide referendum. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4552, 4553
(West 1997) (repealed 1998).
26 For a more complete discussion of this topic, see Angela Gilmore, Employment
Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 6 LAW AND SEXuALrTY 83, 103-106 (1996). There is a
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some states, executive orders ban employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. 7
State statutes prohibiting employment discrimination 28 on the basis of sexual
orientation can be divided into two groups. In some states, sexual orientation is
specifically enumerated as a protected class in a general anti-discrimination lav.29
In other states, sexual orientation is protected under a provision separate from
those protecting other categories.30 While at least one scholar has argued that
these two different types of statutes have been interpreted to provide the same
type of protection, 31 there is some evidence that stand-alone statutes provide
different and less protection.32
The enactment of these state statutes over the past three decades is preferable
to a reliance on local ordinances because state statutes are more politically
secure,33 do not run as great a risk of preemption,34 and necessarily have a
suggestion that dating and cohabiting are protected as "recreational activities," which may not
be the basis for discrimination under New York law; this might be extended to offer protection
to gays and lesbians. See State v. Wal-Mart Stores, 621 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(invalidating fraternization policy as discrimination against recreational activity of dating);
Pasch v. Katz Media Corp., No. Civ. 8564, 1995 WL 469710, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995)
(holding that heterosexual cohabitation is protected recreational activity).
27 See, e.g., Iowa Exec. Order No.7 (1999) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination
in public employment); N.Y. Exec. Order 28.1 (1993) (same). In Louisiana, a similar executive
order, La. Exec. Order No. 92-7 (1992), was allowed to expire. In Ohio, an executive order was
rewritten to exclude gay state employees. See Ohio Exec. Order 83-64 (1983, rewritten 1999).
For a more complete listing of states protecting sexual orientation discrimination by executive
order, see Summary, supra note 7.
28 Many state anti-discrimination statutes extend protection beyond employment to cover
areas such as public accommodations, housing, credit, and other areas. See, e.g., NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993) (prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, credit, or
public accommodation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (1998) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment, housing, and credit).
29 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 363.12(1) (1996) (prohibiting discrimination against an
individual because of that individual's "race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, disability, status with regard to public assistance, sexual orientation, and age").
30 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-81c (1999).
31 See Gilmore, supra note 26, at 97 ("Although two patterns have emerged, each appears
to be equally effective.").
32 One California trial court interpreted a stand-alone statute not to support a harassment
claim which would have been actionable under the state's general anti-discrimination provision.
See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Cases: Murray v. Oceanside Unified School
District, http'//www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/pages/cases/recordrecord=85 (last modified
September 1, 2000) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). For a complete discussion of this
potential problem, see infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
33 Unlike local governments, states cannot categorically forbid the adoption of laws
protecting homosexuals from discrimination. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),
discussed infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
1534 [Vol. 61:1529
ISENDA THE ANSWER?
broader reach and more uniform application.35 Unfortunately, as was made clear
recently in Maine, even state statutes are vulnerable to repeal, and they can lead to
heated and divisive political conflict 36 Moreover, only ten states have afforded
protection to gays and lesbians over the course of eighteen years suggesting that
any meaningful consensus among the states on this issue is still years away.
Federal legislation would not be vulnerable to political referenda or preemption
and would ensure uniformity on the national level.
3. Federal Statutes
Federal anti-discrimination law prohibits employment discrimination on the
bases of race, religion, national origin, and sex;37 age;38 and disability;39 but not
sexual orientation 40 Title VII does not explicitly define the term "sex." However,
the courts have read sex to mean gender, and rejected all attempts to extend Title
VII's protections to sexual orientation 4 1 While there have been several proposals
to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation in the list of protected categories,
they have all failed 4 2 Recent legislative action in this area has focused on passage
of ENDA.43 ENDA was first introduced in the House in 1994.44 It has been
34 There is no federal law addressing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that
could preempt state law. However, there is a potential problem with preemption under ERISA
of state programs that concern domestic partnership benefits. See generally Catherine L. Fisk,
ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN's L.J 267 (1998) (noting that it is widely
assumed that ERISA would preempt application of sexual orientation discrimination laws
against private sector employee benefit plans).
35 See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, Statutory Protection for
Gays and Lesbians in Private Employment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1625, 1630-31 (1996) (noting
that the development of state law in this area has led to the reevaluation of some tenets of
constitutional law, and bringing light to the states' role in expanding civil rights protections).
36 See Sharon M. McGowan, Recent Development, The Fate of ENDA in the Wake of
Maine: A Wake-Up Call to Moderate Republicans, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 623, 633 (1998)
(noting that the repeal of Maine's anti-discrimination statute "magnifies the importance of
federal legislation [to address sexual orientation discrimination]").
37 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
38 Age Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
39 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
4 0 While there is no legislation addressing this issue, in 1998, President Clinton issued an
executive order that added sexual orientation to the list for which discrimination is prohibited in
the federal civilian work force. Exec. Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1999) (amending Exec.
Order No. 11,478,3 C.F.R. 133-35 (1999)).
4 1 See infra Part ll.B.1.
42 See, e.g., H.R. 2074,96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 8269,95th Cong. (1977).
43 For a description of the provisions of ENDA, see infra Part III.
44 See H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994).
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reintroduced in each subsequent Congress,45 and in 1996 failed in the Senate by
only one vote.4 6
In contrast to the failed attempts to extend protection to sexual orientation,
Congress has had some recent success in enacting statutes which are commonly
seen as hostile to the gay rights movement: the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy47
and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).48 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is the
military policy on sexual orientation that allows the military to discharge
members who engage or attempt to engage in homosexual acts, "tell" that they
are homosexual or bisexual, or try to marry someone of the same sex4 9 DOMA
limits the definition of marriage to a union of a man and a woman,50 and allows
states to refuse to recognize marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples by
another state.51
B. Federal Case Law
Since Congress has failed to enact legislation specifically forbidding sexual
orientation discrimination, victims of such discrimination have attempted to find
support for their claims under Title VII or the Constitution. This section examines
the success and likely future of maintaining a claim for sexual orientation
discrimination under existing law, and specifically looks at the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale.52
1. Title VII and Sexual Orientation Discrimination
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.53 was the federal case that
most clearly established that sexual orientation discrimination was not actionable
under Title VII. In DeSantis, three appeals were consolidated: in one, a man
claimed he was fired from his job at a nursery school because he wore an earring
to work prior to the beginning of the school year; in the second, three men
claimed that Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PT&T) discriminated against
them on the basis of their homosexuality; and in the third, two women who
45 ENDA was reintroduced in the House in 1995. See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995). In
1997, it was reintroduced in both the House and the Senate. See H.R. 1858, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997).
46 John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill Against Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, Sept. 11,
1996,atAl.
47 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1994).
48 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. IV 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998).
49 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1994).
50 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. IV. 1998).
51 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp IV. 1998).
52 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
53 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
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worked at PT&T alleged that they had been discriminated against because of their
lesbian relationship.54 The men had first filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but the EEOC rejected the
claims, asserting that it had no jurisdiction over sexual orientation discrimination
claims.55 The district court dismissed all suits for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.56 The Ninth Circuit agreed, and gave four reasons
for its holding.57 First the court noted that "cases interpreting Title VII sex
discrimination provisions agree that they were intended to place women on an
equal footing with men."58 Based on this determination of congressional intent,
the court refused to judicially extend "sex" to cover "sexual preference" such as
homosexuality.59 Second, the DeSantis court refused to find that sexual
orientation discrimination affected one sex more than the other and thus the
plaintiffs failed to establish disparate impact6 0 under the framework earlier
developed by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.61 Third, the court
summarily rejected the claim that sexual orientation discrimination violated Title
VII by using different employment criteria for men and women, again refusing to
"bootstrap" protection for homosexuals. 62 Finally, the court addressed the
argument that sexual orientation discrimination was protected because it was
based on the gender of a person's associates.63 After determining that sexual
54 Id. at 328-29.
55 Id. at 328. The women did not file initial charges with the EEOC, but claimed that their
union failed to represent them adequately. Id at 329.
56 Id. at 328-29.
57 Id. at 329-31.
58 Id at 329 (quoting Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir.
1977)). The Holloway court used the reasoning to deny Title VII protection to transsexuals. See
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
59 DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329-330.
60 Id. at 330. The court assumed that the plaintiffs could establish the disparate impact, but
refused to "bootstrap" protection clearly not envisioned by Congress into Title VII using this
methodology. Id The court did not discuss how the appellants could prove disparate impact.
See id See also infra note 175-76 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of obtaining the
statistics needed to bring a disparate impact claim for sexual orientation discrimination).
61 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The disparate impact framework is discussed more fully at infra
notes 167-81 and accompanying text
62 See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331. The appellants had argued that by treating a male who
preferred male sexual partners differently from a female who preferred male sexual partners
established different employment criteria on the basis of sex. See id.
63 See id The appellants analogized their situation to those who suffered racial
discrimination based on the race of their friends. See id. Courts have found that
antimiscegenation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII as a type of race discrimination.
See, e-g., Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 891-92 (1 1th Cir. 1986);
Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist., 618 F. Supp 1458, 1460 (D. Colo. 1985) ("[Discrimination]
based on an individual's association vith people of a particular race or national origin [is]
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orientation was not protected under "sex," the court then also declined to include
disparate treatment based on "effeminacy" as sex discrimination.64
Earlier cases had established that Iranssexuals 65 and effeminate men66 were
not entitled to protection under the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII, and
DeSantis confirmed the belief that "sex" should be read as "gender." 67 Federal
cases that followed DeSantis uniformly refused to find that sexual orientation was
protected under Title Vl,68 and seemed reluctant to address otherwise legitimate
claims that could be seen as based on sexual orientation.69 But some division did
spring up in the courts in the area of sexual harassment, and whether same-sex
sexual harassment could be considered discrimination "because of' sex.7°
In 1998, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment in Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc.71 In this case,
petitioner Joseph Oncale sued his employer under Title VII, claiming sexual
harassment at the hands of male coworkers.72 The Court found that because the
phrase "'because of... sex' protects men as well as women," there was
consequently no justification for a blanket rule excluding Title VII protection
from same-sex harassment.7 3 But the Court insisted that for such a claim to
prohibited under Title VII."). The parallel reasoning that discrimination on the basis of a
homosexual relationship is discrimination based on sex has been noted by the Hawaii Supreme
Court. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57-64 (Haw. 1993) (remanding for further proceedings to
determine whether a statute allowing heterosexual marriage, but not homosexual marriage,
violated the Equal Protection Clause of Hawaii's constitution because it discriminated on the
basis of sex).
64 See Desantis, 608 F.2d at 331-32. The court relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (refusing to
protect an effeminate man from discrimination under Title VI).
65 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Ulane
v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
6 6 Smith, 569 F.2d at 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978).
67 DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331.
68 See, e.g., Sarff v. Cont'l Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'a 85 F.3d
624 (5th Cir. 1996).
69 See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (determining that an employer who fired a gay Black man was more concerned
with his homosexuality than his race); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (in declining to find pretext where employee claimed he was fired for being
a Jewish White male homosexual, the court noted that there is no claim for sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII).
70 Compare Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (C.D. Ill. 1995)
(holding Title VII protects a male harassed by a male supervisor), with Mayo v. Kiwest Corp.,
898 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding Title VII does not protect a male harassed
by male supervisor).
71 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
72 Id at 76-77.
73 Id. at 78-79.
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succeed, the plaintiff must prove the harassment was "not merely tinged with
offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted [sex discrimination]. '74 In
the Court's view, the harassing conduct did not need to be motivated by sexual
desire if it could be shown that the conduct was directed at someone because of
their gender.75 The Court made no mention of the sexual orientation of either the
harassed or the harasser anywhere in the opinion.
Since Oncale, the federal courts have shown a willingness to hear claims
based on same-sex sexual harassment.76 If, however, such harassment is due to
the harassee's actual or perceived sexual orientation, it is not considered to be
"because of sex," and is thus not punishable.7 7 Interestingly, if the harasser in a
same-sex harassment case is gay, then the harassment is presumed to be "because
of sex."78 The resulting jumble of law has been much criticized,79 but it seems
clear that Title VII, as is, does not punish sexual orientation harassment.
In the end, it seems that the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII so that
"sex!' equals gender.80 While the Court has never directly addressed whether
sexual orientation can equal "sex," the language of Oncale and the uniform view
of the circuit courts that have addressed the issue make clear that Title VII is to be
interpreted as not prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.
Therefore, the current Title VII framework is insufficient to protect homosexuals
from employment discrimination.
74Id. at 81.
75 Id. 80-81.
76 See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1247 (1 1th Cir. 1998)
(hearing a lesbian's claim that she was fired for refusing to resume a relationship with a
coworker); Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1012 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing a
summaryjudgment order, finding that allegations, if proved, could form the basis of a Title VII
claim for same-sex harassment by a homosexual harasser).
77 See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Show, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D. Me.
1998) (holding that same-sex harassment based on plaintiff's conceded homosexuality is not
covered under Title VII, given that Title VII does not protect sexual orientation).
78 See, e.g., Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997)
("[Tjhe reasonably inferred motives of the homosexual harasser are identical to those of the
heterosexual harasser-i.e., the harasser makes advances towards the victim because the victim
is a member of the gender the harasser prefers.").
79 See, e.g., Sony Smallets, Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services: A Victoryfor Gay and
Lesbian Rights?, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. 136, 147-48 (1999) (noting that the Supreme
Court struggled over same-sex harassment but offered no protection from sexual orientation
discrimination).
80 At least one court thinks that the Supreme Court's reading of "sex" might actually be
narrower than gender. See Higgins, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 75 n.9 (D. Me. 1998) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court's vacating of City of Belleview v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998), may show that
the Court favors an even stricter reading of "sex"). Regardless, the studious avoidance of any
discussion of sexual orientation in Oncale suggests that the Court would not extend protection
to harassed homosexuals.
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2. The Constitution and Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Although the federal courts seem to have foreclosed sexual orientation
discrimination claims under Title VII, in recent years there has been a growing
trend to bring these claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Uniformly, courts have refused to find that homosexuals constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class and have refused to analyze them under heightened
scrutiny.81 However, the Supreme Court has analyzed one case on equal
protection grounds,82 and some recent federal cases employing rational basis
scrutiny have afforded some protection to gays and lesbians.83
In Romer v. Evans,84 the Supreme Court struck down Colorado's
Amendment 2, a constitutional amendment that prohibited all legal action in the
State of Colorado designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination.85
Amendment 2 had been adopted by public referendum with the goal of
invalidating local ordinances in Aspen, Boulder, Denver, and elsewhere that
prohibited sexual orientation discrimination in some way.86 Colorado claimed
that this provision merely put gays and lesbians in the same position as all other
persons, and did no more than deny "special" rights to homosexuals. 87 The Court
disagreed, and found that "the amendment impose[d] a special disability on
[homosexuals] alone."'88 Under an Equal Protection analysis, the Court held that
the state's asserted justification failed to meet the rational basis test.89 The Court
characterized the amendment as both too narrow and too broad: "identifLying]
persons by a single trait and then den[ying] them protection across the board."90 It
81 See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The District Court of Kansas found that homosexuals did constitute a
suspect class for equal protection analysis, but the case was reversed on appeal. See Jantz v.
Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992). Scholars have
continually argued that gay men and lesbians should be seen as a suspect class. See, e.g.,
Sunanda K. Ray-Holmes, Discrimination Based on One's Sexual Preference: Should Strict
Scrutiny Apply?, 34 How. L.J. 341,366 (1991). But see Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop
the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 393, 401-412 (1994) (arguing that gays and lesbians should not be considered a
suspect class).
82 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
83 See, e.g., Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998); Quinn v.
Nassau County Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
84 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
85 Id. at 635.
86 Id. at 623-34.
87 Id. at 626.
88 Id. at 631.
89 Id. at 631-632.
90 Id. at 633.
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was further found that Amendment 2 violated conventional principles of
legislation; it did not bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose,
because it was aimed at harming a politically unpopular group out of animosity. 91
While the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Equal Protection
Clause can be violated when a state discriminates against its employees on the
basis of sexual orientation, several lower courts have addressed the issue. In
Weaver v. Nebo School District,92 a public school teacher successfully challenged
a school district's restriction on her speech prohibiting her from discussing her
sexual orientation, as well as the decision not to appoint her as volleyball coach
on the basis that she was gay.93 In discussing the claim of sexual orientation
discrimination, the court first noted that sexual orientation was not
"recognized... as a status that deserves heightened protection," and that no
federal or state law (in Utah) protected employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.94 The court then went on, though, to cite the Equal Protection
Clause and analyzed the teacher's discharge to see if there was a rational basis for
the decision. 95 After distinguishing cases upholding the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy on the ground that the military context was sufficiently different from the
civilian context at issue, the court noted that "[t]he 'negative reaction' some
members of the community may have to homosexuals is not a proper basis for
discriminating against them."9 6 It analogized to racial school segregation as
another unconstitutional practice despite its former widespread acceptance. 97
Then the court found that the school district showed no job-related justification
for its decision not to appoint the teacher as volleyball coach, as the district could
not show a rational relationship between her sexual orientation and her coaching
abilities.98 The court ended by noting that while "the Constitution cannot control
prejudices, [no] ... court... should, directly or indirectly, legitimize them."99
Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has also been found unlawful
under the Equal Protection Clause in Quinn v. Nassau County Police
Department o00 In Quinn, a homosexual police officer brought a § 1983 action
against the police department and officers, alleging, in part, that the harassment he
had suffered because of his sexual orientation created a hostile work environment
9 1 Id. at 634-45.
92 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998).
93 Ia at 1289-90.
94 Id. at 1287.
95 Id
96 Id at 1288-1289.
97 See id at 1289.
98 See id
99 Id
1(0 53 F. Supp. 347,356-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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and violated his Equal Protection rights.101 The court, in its equal protection
analysis, first noted that sex discrimination by a government employer was
covered by § 1983.102 The court cited Romer v. Evans, and found that the
supervising officers' failure to address and outright condoning of homosexual
harassment was "impermissible 'status-based' [conduct and policy] divorced
from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests."' 10 3 In these circumstances, the court found that the only inference
to be drawn from Quinn's mistreatment was that it derived from animosity toward
homosexuals. 104 The court distinguished a district court ruling precluding a
homosexual harassment claim under Title VIII05 by saying that Equal Protection
analysis is not limited by express categories, as is Title VII.106
Do Romer, Weaver, and Quinn suggest that the same courts that are reluctant
to extend "sex" to encompass sexual orientation in Title VII are willing to find
that sexual orientation discrimination by the state violates the Equal Protection
Clause? Perhaps, but the continued failure of any court to recognize homosexuals
as a class deserving of heightened protection is troubling, especially in light of
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.10 7 In Kimel, the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred federal jurisdiction over Age
Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) suits brought by private individuals
against the states.108 The Court found that Congress had explicitly intended to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, 109 but lacked the power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to do so.110 The Court held that because age was not a
101 Id. at 355. Section 1983 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
102 Id. at 356. The court cited two cases for this proposition: Annis v. County of
Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1994), and Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35
(1979).
103 Quinn, 53 F. Supp. at 358 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620,635 (1996)).
104 Quinn, 53 F. Supp. at 358.
105 Simonton v. Runyon, 50 F. Supp. 2d 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
106 Quinn, 53 F. Supp. at 359.
107 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
108 Id. at 650. Kimel followed a series of Court decisions invoking state sovereign
immunity to deny jurisdiction over suits against states. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999). The Court has also granted certiorari on a case
challenging the ADA on sovereign immunity grounds. See University of Alabama at
Birmingham Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 527 U.S. 666,689 (mem.) (2000).109 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640. The test requires that Congress make its intention to
override the Eleventh Amendment "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute?' Id
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985)).110 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644. The Court had previously held that Congress could not
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity to suits brought by private individuals under Article I
(the Commerce Clause). See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. Therefore, the ADEA could
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suspect class, the ADEA was not an appropriate, proportional law under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.111
The result in Kimel suggests that sexual orientation discrimination claims
brought against states will raise sovereign immunity issues. While it is relatively
easy to write a statute that explicitly sets out to abrogate state immunity, 12 it is
hard to get around the decisions that have found that sexual orientation is not a
suspect class and sexual orientation discrimination can be upheld under the
rational basis test. Weaver and Quinn show that state action can still be
successfully challenged on equal protection grounds, but under Kimel, it is
unclear whether any federal statute could provide grounds for a legal
challenge.113
While Weaver and Quinn suggest that sexual orientation discrimination can
fail even minimal scrutiny under equal protection analysis, not all courts have
agreed.114 Moreover, equal protection analysis applies only to state actors-
private employees cannot succeed on these claims. And there is a possibility that
any sexual orientation anti-discrimination statute passed will be inapplicable to
the states after Kimel. The Constitution, then, does not provide an answer to the
problem of sexual orientation discrimination.
3. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale"15
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,116 the Supreme Court held that a New
Jersey law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by public
accommodations could not be applied to force the Boy Scouts to reinstate a gay
troop leader. The Court's decision was founded on the First Amendment-to
force the Boy Scouts to accept gay men would violate their freedom of
association. While the Dale rationale will not apply to a hypothetical federal law
abrogate sovereign immunity only if it were "appropriate" legislation under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644.
111 Because age is not a suspect class, an age-based classification is upheld if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645-46. The court
applied a proportionality test, and found that by forbidding all discrimination on the basis of
age, Congress had overstepped its Section 5 power, since it had no evidence that state and local
governments were unconstitutionally discriminating. See id. at 650.
112 ENDA would pass this first test. See S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 13 (1999) ("A State shall
not be immune under the 11 th amendment to the Constitution from an action in a Federal court
of competentjurisdiction.').
113 This further suggests that, despite their shortcomings, state anti-discrimination statutes
may play an important role in combating sexual orientation discrimination.
114 See supra note 80.
115 120 S. Ct 2446 (2000).
116 Id
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prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment" 7 the Court's
reasoning is instructive as to both the need for such federal legislation and the
way that the Court treats sexual orientation differently from other classes
protected under anti-discrimination laws.
James Dale, an assistant scoutmaster, was expelled from the Boy Scouts of
America (BSA) once it was discovered that he was gay.118 Dale claimed that the
BSA violated New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD),119 which
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in places of public accommodation. 120
The New Jersey Supreme Court found for Dale, holding that the BSA did violate
LAD and that enforcement of LAD did not impinge upon the BSA's First
Amendment rights of association or speech.121 The United States Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision, reversed, holding that the BSA's right of expressive association
was violated by application of LAD in these circumstances. 122
The Supreme Court's decision was based on its finding that the BSA publicly
expressed a view that homosexuality is inconsistent with the BSA's requirement
that Scout's be "morally straight."123 The Court noted that a compelling state
interest can justify a state intrusion on an organization's associational rights, but
found that the state interests in this case did not.124 The dissent, in contrast,
argued that no constitutional rights of the BSA had been infringed.125 The dissent
noted that harmful anti-gay prejudice "can only be aggravated by the creation of a
constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product of a habitual way of
thinking about strangers."'1 26
The result of the Dale decision seems to be that any group that presents
"moral" objections to gays and lesbians is free to discriminate under the First
117 Employers cannot claim the same freedom of association right
118Id. at 2449.
119 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:2-1, :5-4, :5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
120 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449-50.
121 Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999)
122 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
123 Id at 2453-54. The Supreme Court accepted the BSA's assertion that homosexuality
conflicted with its ideal of "morally straight" on its face. See id.
124 Id. at 2457 ('The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodation law
do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association."). But see id at 2479 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("BSA has not made out an expressive
association claim... because of its failure to make sexual orientation the subject of any
unequivocal advocacy, using the channels it customarily employs to state its message").
125 Id. at 2460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent found it "exceedingly difficult to
believe that BSA... adopts a single particular religious or moral philosophy when it comes to
sexual orientation" and found that by looking at the actual teachings of the BSA, there was no
"expression" against homosexuality which implicated the First Amendment. See id. at 2462-
63.
126 Id. at 2478. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Amendment. One must question, though, whether the Court would have reached
the same result in Dale if the Boy Scouts held the belief that only Caucasians
were "morally straight." In fact, as the dissent noted, the Court has routinely
struck down association claims to anti-discrimination laws brought by groups
with exclusionary membership policies. 127 The dissent claimed that "[t]he only
apparent explanation for the majority's holding... is that homosexuals are simply
so different from the rest of society that their presence alone-unlike any other
individual's-should be singled out for special First Amendment treatment." 128
The majority's reasoning in Dale suggests that courts which tackle laws
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination may still be wary to apply those laws
to people who discriminate on the basis of "morals." This suggests that any
federal legislation which aims to end sexual orientation discrimination is likely to
be met by great resistance from the courts,129 and suggests that all such legislation
must be carefully drafted to avoid unintended judicial weakening.130
III. ENDA: SEPARATE, BUTNOT EQUAL
From 1975131 until 1993, legislative attempts to protect homosexuals from
discrimination focused on amending Title VII and failed.132 In 1993, the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) was proposed as an alternative.
Representative Barney Frank, 133 a supporter of ENDA, suggests it is a "better
legislative response" to the problem of sexual orientation discrimination in
employment than amending Title VII, and would result in "identical legal
127 Id. at 2467-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The following cases are cited by the dissent:
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976) (forbidding private schools from adopting
racially exclusionary admission policies); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)
(forbidding a law firm from denying partnership to a woman); Ry. MailAss'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S.
88, 93-94 (1945) (forbidding a labor organization to deny membership on the basis of race);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-26 (forbidding Jaycees from excluding all
women); Bd of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (forbidding
Rotary members from excluding women).
128 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 9 Indeed, much of this resistance may still be due to the Supreme Court's much-
maligned decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality
of Georgia's sodomy law).
130 See infra Part III.B.
131 See H.R. 166, 94th Cong. (1975) (proposing that Title VII be amended to include
sexual orientation).
132 See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 & n. 11 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing
numerous failed attempts by Congress to amend Title VII).
133 Congressman Frank represents the Fourth District of Massachusetts and is openly gay.
See Representative Barney Frank at http'/vww.house.govlfrank (last modified October 18,
2000). He has long been a supporter of ENDA, and helped introduce it in 1999.
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protection... for gay and lesbian people."'134 He argues that amendment of Title
VII would give opponents of affirmative action the chance to remove the
voluntary affirmative action provision from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.135 He
also argues that legislation can be passed only if it "disavow[s] any interest in
affirmative action" and that the ENDA approach is more politically popular than
any involving Title Vj. 13 6
The basic framework of ENDA is superficially similar to that of Title VII. It
forbids employers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation with
regard to hiring, fning, or terms of employment;137 forbids retaliatory conduct;13 8
and is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 139 ENDA
would adopt the basic disparate treatment framework developed under Title
VII, 140 but excludes religious organizations1 41 and the militaryI42 from its
coverage; does not allow disparate impact theory 43 or affirmative action; 144 and
does not require the provision of employee benefits to domestic partners. 145
134 Barney Frank, CivilRights, Legislative Wrongs, ADVOCATE, Feb. 15,2000, at 9.135 See id Frank also argues that the Title VII approach would allow opponents to argue
that the goal is to grant homosexuals "special rights." See id The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).136 Id
137 S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 4(a) (1999) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment .... because of such individual's sexual orientation. ... "). ENDA also forbids
segregation or classification based on sexual orientation that would result in discrimination. See
id. § 4(a)(2). Like Title VII, ENDA also forbids discrimination by employment agencies and
labor organizations. See id §§ 4(b), 4(c).
138 Id. § 5 (prohibiting both retaliation against and coercion of individuals who file
charges under ENDA).
139 Id § 12 (granting the same enforcement power, procedures, and remedies to the
EEOC as under Title VII).
140 See Frank, supra note 134 (setting forth the basic disparate treatment theory of Title
VII, where the plaintiff must make a prima facie case for discrimination, then the employer can
offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action). Title VII contains a
statutory defense in the form of the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (not discrimination if religion, sex, or national origin is a BFOQ "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business"). It could be seen as an instance
where ENDA is actually stronger than Title VII on its face, but this is the provision from Title
VII that is most likely to be read into ENDA. Of course, given the broad exceptions already
granted under ENDA, it is unlikely that employers would need to assert a BFOQ defense.
141 S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 9 (1999).
142 Id. § 10.
143 Id. § 4(f).
144 Id. §8.
145Id. §6.
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The protection of ENDA is not "identical" to that of an amended Title VII.
This is because ENDA includes exceptions that do not exist in Title VII. Further,
by treating sexual orientation under a stand-alone measure, Congress encourages
the courts to construe ENDA differently. It is by no means clear that sexual
orientation discrimination in employment will be adequately addressed by a
"separate but equal" statutory provision.
A. Exceptions to ENDA
While ENDA is intended to provide the same anti-discrimination protection
as Title VII, ENDA is different from Title VII in several key areas.146 This
Section explores three parts of Title VII that have been excepted from ENDA:
voluntary affirmative action plans, disparate impact theory, and coverage of
religious organizations.
1. Voluntary Affirmative Action
Title VII allows employers to adopt "voluntary affirmative action" plans.
147
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into
account in an employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer. 148 The
Supreme Court requires that affirmative action plans: (1) are designed to break
down "old patterns of racial [or sex-based] segregation and hierarchy"; 149 (2) do
not "unnecessarily trammel the interests" of non-minorities; 150 and (3) are
temporary, and designed to eliminate racial imbalance, not maintain an existent
racial balance.151
ENDA explicitly disallows quotas and preferential treatment, and thus does
not allow employers to adopt voluntary affirmative action plans.' 52 It is argued
14 6 See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
147 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber was
questioned by the Supreme Court in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984), which suggested that when dealing with seniority systems, Title VII protected victims
of proven discrimination but not beneficiaries of affirmative action. The basic holding of Weber
was reaffirmed by the Court, though, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
148 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
149 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
150 Id. The Court noted that a relevant inquiry on this point is whether the plan created "an
absolute bar to the advancement of [non-minority] employees." Id.
151 Id.
152See S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 8(a) (1999) ("A covered entity shall not adopt or
implement a quota on the basis of sexual orientation."); id § 8(b) ("A covered entity shall not
give preferential treatment to an individual on the basis of sexual orientation."); id § 8(c)
("[A]n order or consent decree... may not include a quota, or preferential treatment... !).
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that homosexuals have not suffered the same historical disadvantages as females
and racial minorities. 153 Moreover, opponents of sexual orientation discrimination
legislation feel that affirmative action is the quintessential example of a "special
right" sought by homosexuals.154
But what really is the harm of affirmative action? Under current law,
employers may freely adopt plans that do prefer people of one sexual orientation
over the other;, yet there is not a rash of employers scrambling to adopt policies
that favor gay and lesbian employees. Any employer that did provide affirmative
action for gays and lesbians would probably face extensive criticism. 155 Given the
derogatory "special rights" moniker often applied to these plans,156 it is unlikely
that even if they are permissible under law they will be widely adopted.
Two reasons have been suggested to justify affirmative action plans on the
basis of sexual orientation. First, it is suggested that homosexuals are, in fact,
subject to disadvantage in the workplace. 157 While some homosexuals might be
subject to little prejudice in their fields of employment, others may be
discriminated against invidiously.158 Statistics that relate the economic well-being
of homosexuals as a class can be misleading, as many disadvantaged individuals
153 Professor Ruth Colker suggests that the disadvantage rationale may not be applicable
in all cases because gay, lesbian, and bisexual people face differing amounts of prejudice and
hardship. See RuTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISExuALS, MULTrACIALs, AND OTHER MIsFrrs UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 81-82 (1996).
154 See Jeffrey S. Byrne & Bruce R. Deming, On the Prudence of Discussing Affirmative
Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: Community, Strategy, and Equality, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 177, 179 (1993) (noting the success of the "'special rights' rhetoric"); Frank, supra note
134 (commenting on the "special" rights problem).
155 Companies that provide domestic benefits have often been the subject of protests. See,
e.g., Lisa Perry, Demonstration: Group Protests Disney 'Agenda,' DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July
11, 1999, at 1OA (discussing the boycott of Disney carried out to protest its "pro-gay agenda,"
including offering domestic partner benefits).
156 Representative Frank has stated that ENDA was proposed in large part to avoid the
"special rights" claim. See Marcelo Vilela, Out in Congress, available at
http://www.house.gov/franklkstate.html (last modified Feb. 28, 2000) (quoting Frank as
saying that '"ying to change the Civil Rights Act would be used by opponents of gay rights to
reinforce the false political argument that gays were trying to get affirmative action") (on file
with the Ohio State Law Journal). See also 142 CONG. REC. S10,054, S10,057 (daily ed. Sept.
9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ('There are no quotas or preferential treatment."). Many
scholars view the debate over "special" versus "equal" rights as a false dichotomy, and several
suggest that the only way to reach equality is to grant these "special rights." See generally
Marcosson, supra note 1, at 158-59 (arguing that "special rights" are no more than basic civil
rights and the "special rights" argument is inconsistent with modem views of civil rights and is
merely an appeal to prejudices).
157 See Byme & Deming, supra note 154.
158 See COLKER, supra note 153, at 81. Professor Colker suggests that "individualized
storytelling," or looking to the disadvantage faced by a specific individual, may be the best way
to justify implementing affirmative action by an individual. Id
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may choose not to identify themselves as homosexual. 159 Does it make sense to
assert on the one hand that homosexuals as a class are discriminated against
invidiously, while at the same time denying that the class is subject to any
disadvantage in obtaining employment opportunity?
Second, affirmative action might be supported under a "role model
theory.' 160 Under this theory, "out" individuals are entitled to preferential
lreatment so that they might serve as role models for other homosexuals. 161 The
presence of gay and lesbian employees in the workplace would "symbolically
challenge stereotypes" and "promotef acceptance through daily interaction"
among heterosexual and homosexual employees.' 62 Openly gay employees can
help employers as well, by developing mentoring relationships with other gay
employees. 163
Education is one employment context that clearly shows how both
justifications for affirmative action can coexist. Teachers, as a group, have been
subject to an inordinate amount of anti-gay discrimination in their work.164
Within the schools, there is also a particular need for gay and lesbian teachers to
serve as role models.165 Not surprisingly, some colleges have adopted affirmative
159 It is hypothesized that individuals who are economically well-off are more able and
willing to identify themselves as homosexuals, and that this might skew the existing data. There
is also some evidence that gay men are paid disproportionately less than their heterosexual
coworkers. See Badgett, supra note 1, at 737 (reporting incomes reduced by 11% to 27%).
160 SeeJeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for
True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 47, 69-70
(1993) (discussing the "role model" theory).
161 See id; COLKER, supra note 153, at 82.
162 Byrne, supra note 160, at 69-70.
163 See id at70.
164 This is evidenced in part by the sheer number of discrimination suits that have been
raised by teachers. See, e.g., Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998)
(discussed supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp 1543, 1548
(D. Kan. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussed supra note
81); Morrison v. State Bd. of Ed., 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (state teaching
certification was improperly revoked because of Mr. Morrison's homosexual relationship).
Testimony during Senate floor debate on ENDA in 1996 shows that several Senators were
opposed to ENDA in part because it would apply to schools. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S9986,
S10,000 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); 142 CONG. REc. S9986,
S10,000 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles); 142 CONG. REC. S9986, S10,003
(daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
165 See Anthony E. Varona, Setting the Record Straight: The Effects of the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay and
Lesbian Public Schoolteachers, 6 COMMLAw CONSPECrus 25, 34-35 (arguing that the lack of
positive role models for gay schoolchildren furthers their sense of isolation). See also A.
Damien Martin & Emery S. Hetrick, The Stigmatization of the Gay and Lesbian Adolescent, 15
J. HoMosExuALry 163, 167 (1988) ('There is little or no opportunity for the homosexually
oriented adolescent to discover what it means to be homosexual.").
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action-like practices to increase the number of gay and lesbian professors. 166
Given the disadvantage faced by gay and lesbian educators and their positive
value as role models, affirmative action plans based on sexual orientation are
justified.
2. Disparate Impact Theory
Developed under Title VII, the disparate impact theory allows a plaintiff to
show that a facially neutral practice or policy of an employer can nevertheless
have a disproportionate impact on a protected group. 167 Once the employee has
established that such a disparate impact is caused, the burden falls on the
employer to establish that the challenged practice is both related to the job and a
business necessity.168 If the employer meets its burden, the employee will still
prevail if she can prove pretext or the existence of an alternative employment
practice that (1) eliminates the discrimination and (2) was not adopted by the
employer.169
Disparate impact theory was introduced to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." 170 The
Court recognized that neutral practices that did serve to maintain a discriminatory
status quo were contrary to the intent of Congress, and did not require a showing
of intent on the part of the employer. 171 Justice O'Connor has suggested that the
disparate impact theory is really justified on the grounds that facially neutral
practices that have a disparate impact on protected groups are inherently
166 See, e.g., Alice Dembner, Northeastern Takes Steps to Hire More Gays, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 28, 1994, at 20 (describing an affirmative action program for gay and lesbian
professors at Northeastern University). But see Anthony Flint & Kay Longcope, Kennedy
School Shows Caution on Gay Initiative, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1991, at 25 (school stated
that it did not offer preferential treatment to gays and lesbians despite recommendation of an
affirmative action program).
167 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994). The Supreme Court first recognized that
facially neutral practices that have a disparate impact on protected groups were forbidden under
Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424(1971).
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Griggs required that any practice shown to have a
disparate impact must be both related to the job and necessary for the employer. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 431. In 1989, the Court changed the defense by replacing business necessity with
reasonable employer justification, and changing the employer's affirmative defense to a mere
burden of production. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1990). The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 legislatively overruled Wards Cove and returned to the affirmative
defense set forth in Griggs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
170 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
171 Id. at432.
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discriminatory and are the functional equivalent of intentional discrimination. 172
O'Connor's understanding of disparate impact is that it roots out "hidden" intent.
ENDA explicitly disallows recovery under a "disparate impact" theory of
discrimination. 173 There are two main reasons suggested to justify the absence of
disparate impact theory under ENDA, but neither one is compelling. First, it is
argued that disparate impact protection is not warranted because homosexuals are
more likely to be the victims of outward discrimination, which is actionable under
the disparate treatment theory, than involuntary discrimination, which is
actionable only under disparate impact theory.174 While it is undoubtedly true that
overt discrimination should be the main target of any non-discrimination statute,
disallowing a disparate impact challenge will allow employers to circumvent the
law by enacting facially neutral policies that disproportionately affect gays and
lesbians. Because one rationale for disparate impact theory is the weeding out of
this "hidden" discriminatory intent, it is hard to see why this theory should not be
extended to sexual orientation.
Second, there will be great practical difficulties in proving that a policy exerts
a disparate impact based on sexual orientation. Because of the difficulties of
gathering statistics on the populations of homosexuals inside the workplace and in
the general population, plaintiffs would be unable to prove that a given practice
has a disproportionate impact on gays and lesbians.175 Some have suggested that
inclusion of a disparate impact theory would require employers to keep track of
the number of gays and lesbians who worked for them. 176
One clear instance where the disparate impact theory could be useful would
be in challenging employee benefits plans tied to marriage.177 Given the Defense
of Marriage Act and its state counterparts, a practice that differentiates between
people because of their marital status must have a disparate impact on
homosexuals simply because, regardless of the statistical prevalence of
homosexuals in the population or the work force, homosexuals cannot marry. 178
Once the discriminatory effect of such a policy is established, the employer must
172 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (plurality).
173 S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 4(f) (1999) ("[Tihe fact that an employment practice has a
disparate impact, as the term 'disparate impact' is used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... on
the basis of sexual orientation does not establish a prima facie violation of this Act.").
174 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 134.
175 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,054, S10,056 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
176 This is the major reason given by supporters of ENDA for the exclusion of disparate
impact theory. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 134.
177 While ENDA has an exception that explicitly excludes benefit plans, see S. 1276,
106th Cong. § 6 (1999), any policy that depended on marital status would have a similar
impact.
178 There would be no need for actual numbers in such a case, thus negating the second
reason given above for not allowing disparate impact under ENDA.
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then prove job relatedness and business necessity. It would be difficult for an
employer to meet this part of the test.179 Perhaps the most compelling evidence
against the business necessity of forbidding domestic partnership benefits is the
number of large companies that have extended benefits to domestic partners. 180
While it might be difficult at present to make the statistical showing needed
to support a disparate impact claim based on sexual orientation, this is not to say
that it will always be difficult to do so. If policies that seek to eradicate sexual
orientation discrimination succeed,181 it may become possible to collect the
statistics needed to make a disparate impact challenge based on sexual
orientation. Not allowing this theory under ENDA is short-sighted and effectively
legitimizes the adoption of facially neutral yet practically discriminatory policies
by employers.
3. Exemption ofReligious Organizations
Perhaps the most discussed issue concerning sexual orientation
discrimination laws is their application to religious employers. Because many
religions condemn homosexuality as immoral, 182 many feel that application of
statutes such as ENDA to religious organizations would violate the organizations'
right of Free Exercise as guaranteed by the First Amendment.18 3
Title VII has specific exemptions that allow religious institutions to
discriminate-but only on the basis of religion; not race, color, sex, or national
origin.184 These exemptions have been read narrowly under Title VII, and some
17 9 See Development in the Law, supra note 35, at 1636-37 (noting the difficulty in
proving business necessity).
180 Apple Computer, Levi Strauss, Microsoft, and MCA are only a few examples. See
HEwrrr Assocs., DOMESTIC PARTNERS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITs 1994, at 20-22.
181 Success of these policies would lead to more openly gay and lesbian employees, and
reduce the stigma of homosexuality that keeps people "closeted."
182 Many religions (particularly various Protestant denominations) are currently divided
on the issue of homosexuality, and particularly on the legitimacy of gay marriage (or church-
blessed partnerships). See, e.g., Erik Meers, Religion: Out for God, ADVOCATE, Mar. 28, 2000,
at 18 (Episcopal church installs gay dean, despite continuing church debate over gays and
lesbians). Religious objection to homosexuality is by no means universal, and one can argue
that exempting all religions (regardless of their views on homosexuality) from ENDA clearly
favors some religious views over others.
183 See Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principles andAnti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189,329-51
(1999) (discussing the Free Exercise concerns implicated by anti-discrimination laws); see
generally David B. Cruz, Note, Piety and Prejudice: Free Exercise Exemption From Laws
Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176 (1994) (discussing the
limits of religious autonomy and state authority in this area).
184 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994) (establishing a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense for employers to discriminate on the basis of religion); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1,
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religiously affiliated organizations have failed to defend discrimination actions.185
Organizations that have asserted a religious basis for discriminatory practices
have not fared well under other laws either.186
ENDA does not provide narrow exceptions to religious organizations, but
instead exempts all religious organizations from coverage.' 87 There is a narrow
exception to this exemption, providing that positions solely concerned with
"unrelated business taxable income" are subject to ENDA. 188 There is no
requirement that a particular sexual orientation be a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ);189 religious organizations are free to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation unless the position involved is solely involved in for-
profit, non-religious activity. 90
ENDA's exemption of religious organizations clouds Congress' intent in
enacting the statute.191 Title VII is clear--employers, including religious
organizations, cannot discriminate unless they do so on the basis of a BFOQ.
Under ENDA, employers can discriminate for any reason if they are religious.
This sends a mixed message-if Congress really intended to stamp out sexual
orientation discrimination, why are religious groups above it? Certainly, there
2000e-2(e)(2) (allowing religious educational institutions and religious schools to discriminate
on the basis of religion).
185 See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha SchlBishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 461-65 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that where the ownership, affiliation, purpose, student body, and curriculum
were secular or religiously neutral, a school could not discriminate against teachers on the basis
of their religion).
186 The seminal case in this area is Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court held that the government interest in eradicating racial
discrimination was compelling and denied a tax exemption to a university that forbade
interracial dating. Id. at 604.
187 S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 9(a) (1999). A religious organization is defined as a "religious
corporation, association, or society" or an educational institution, if it is either "controlled,
managed, owned or supported" by a religious organization or has a "curriculum... directed
toward the propagation of a religion." Id. § 3(8).
188 Id. § 9(b). Unrelated business taxable income is income that is subject to tax
under section 511 (a) of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 511(a).
S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 9(b) (1999).
189 One anomaly of ENDA is the absence ofa BFOQ defense.
190 It is unclear exactly what type of position would be "solely" concerned with unrelated
business taxable income. If "solely" is read strictly by the courts, it is hard to imagine that any
position in a religious organization would be seen as "solely" involved with the non-religious
aspects of the organization.
191 Besides this problem, there is also a strong argument that such a religious exemption
violates the Establishment Clause. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to
Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMoRY
L.J. 1189, 1228-29 (1994) (arguing that allowing religious organizations to discriminate on
grounds other than religion, where secular employers cannot, may violate the Establishment
Clause).
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may be First Amendment concerns implicated, but these concerns would also be
implicated under Title VI.1 92 By excusing religious organizations from following
ENDA, Congress seems to suggest that it doesn't want to tell a religion that it's
wrong about sexual orientation. But the courts and Congress have had no trouble
telling religious organizations that discriminate on the basis of race that they are
violating public policy. Given this discrepancy, how can one not view sexual
orientation as a second-rate protected class in employment discrimination? 193
B. Interpretive Problems
Beyond the specific differences in protection between ENDA and Title VII, it
is possible, and indeed likely, that courts interpreting ENDA would find that it, as
stand-alone legislation, is sufficiently different from Title VII so that it could be
interpreted differently. While the ADEA and ADA are both set up on the same
basic framework as Title VII, the courts have not hesitated to read these separate
statutes quite differently from Title VII. For example, it is unclear whether
disparate impact theory, which is clearly recognized under Title VfI, is available
under the ADEA.194 Also, the terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
192 Title VII allows religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion, and
thus respects the potential Free Exercise claims of these organizations. While such treatment is
constitutionally permissible, it is not constitutionally mandated-except perhaps in the case of
"religious function" employees. See Buchanan, supra note 191, at 1231. Under the Supreme
Court's current formulation of the Free Exercise Clause, entities cannot be exempted from the
reach of a generally applicable (i.e., not targeted at religion) law. Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (no religious exemption granted to a generally applicable law
criminalizing the use of peyote). The Smith standard suggests that neither ENDA nor Title VII
need contain a religious exemption of any kind to be in harmony with the First Amendment.193 For an in-depth discussion of the equivalence of sexual orientation with race and sex,
see generally Battaglia, supra note 183, at 356-62. Bill Bradley supported amending Title VII
because it "would clearly indicate... that discrimination against gay people is every bit as
serious as discrimination against other protected groups.' Michael Kranish, Bradley Leads,
Gore Follows in Trumpeting Gay Rights, NEw ORLEANs TIMEs-PICAYuNE, Nov. 25, 1999, at
16A. 194 The Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue, though two Justices have noted that
the question is unsettled. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) ('This Court has never held that proof of discriminatory
impact can establish a violation of the ADEA....'); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
618 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Markham for the same proposition). See generally
Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 507 (asserting that the controversy is
fundamentally a policy dispute over the definition of age discrimination and the appropriate
scope of the ADEA).
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hardship" used in both Title VII and the ADA, have been read very differently in
the two statutes. 195
The problem of addressing sexual orientation in stand-alone legislation as
opposed to a comprehensive employment discrimination statute is currently being
litigated by the Lambda Legal Defense Fund in California.196 California offered
protection to gay and lesbian employees under its Labor Code, in a provision
separate from the statute governing other types of employment discrimination.197
In this case, Murray v. Oceanside Unified School District, the plaintiff is a school
teacher.198 She alleged she was denied a promotion and suffered sexual-
orientation harassment because she was a lesbian. 199 The trial court dismissed the
case, in part by finding that the non-discrimination statute covered only the hiring,
firing, and promotion of an employee.200 While harassment was recognized under
the general anti-discrimination statute,2 01 the court held that California's sexual-
orientation discrimination statute did not support a harassment claim. 202
195 In Title VII, employers have a duty to "reasonably accommodate" the religious
observance and practice of employees unless the accommodation entails "undue hardship." 42
U.S.C. § 2000() (1994). Anything more than a de minimis cost is seen as an undue hardship in
this context. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). The ADA also
requires that employers reasonably accommodate disabled employees in the absence of undue
hardship. ADA § 12112(b)(5) (1994). "Undue hardship" under the ADA is defined as
"significant difficulty or expense," to be determined by considering all relevant factors. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1999).
196 The case, Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Disict, is set for oral argument before
the California Court of Appeals in March, 2000. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Cases: Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/pages/cases/ record?record=85 (last modified Sept. 1, 2000) (on file with the Ohio State
Law Journal).
1 9 7 California now includes sexual orientation in its general anti-discrimination protection.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West Supp. 2000) (forbidding discrimination on the basis of
"race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex, or sexual orientation"). This lawsuit was, however, filed
under an earlier law. See CAL LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (1997), repealed 1999 (forbidding
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation only).
198 Murray, at http://wwwv.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/cases/record?record=85
(last modified September 1, 2000) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
199 Id.
200 Id. The court also found against the plaintiff because she failed to file notice under the
state Tort Claims Act and thus failed to preserve the sexual-orientation discrimination claim
against the school district, and also found that her claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress were precluded by the state's workers' compensation statute. Ia
201 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h) (West 1992).
2 02 Id. As sexual orientation is now included in California's general anti-discrimination
provision, it would now be impossible for the California court to use this reasoning. Sexual
orientation harassment is now explicitly prohibited in Califomia. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12940(h)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
2000] 1555
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
Murray points out the problem with stand-alone legislation. This case
suggests that federal courts interpreting ENDA will not necessarily recognize the
same legal theories that have been developed under Title VII. Like ENDA, the
California statute at issue in Murray was separate from the general anti-
discrimination statute. ENDA does not explicitly address harassment, and it is
therefore possible that sexual orientation harassment will not be punishable under
it.
There are other interpretive theories developed under Title VII that should be
extended to sexual orientation, as well. Besides harassment, courts interpreting
Title VII have almost uniformly denied finding that an employer's rationale of
"customer preference" to justify discrimination is not a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason or a BFOQ.203 It is by no means clear that customer
preference will be recognized as an invalid defense under ENDA. For example,
take a hypothetical employer whose customers are predominantly religious
organizations. Given ENDA's exception that allows religious organizations to
discriminate on the basis on sexual orientation, it is easy to see why courts might
have a difficult time forbidding this employer from sexual orientation
discrimination.
Addressing sexual orientation discrimination in ENDA and not in Title VII
will only serve to highlight the differences between sexual orientation
discrimination and discrimination based on race, color, sex, or national origin.
204
Given the reluctance of federal courts to afford protection to homosexuals in
employment under Title VII,20 5 it is logical to assume that ENDA will not be read
as expansively as Title VII, and the protection offered to gays and lesbians will be
limited. The numerous exceptions to ENDA discussed above may also be used by
courts to find that Congress did not intend for ENDA's protection to be as far-
reaching as Title VII's.
203 The seminal case denying customer preference is Diaz v. Pan American World
Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). In Diaz, Pan American defended its practice of
hiring only female flight attendants by claiming that its customers preferred them to males. Id.
at 387. The court rejected this BFOQ claim, finding that "it would be totally anomalous if we
were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid." Id. at 389. See also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273,
1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting argument that Latin American customers' preferences for
male representatives established a BFOQ for sex discrimination).
204 As noted in the discussion of the Dale case, supra Part ll.B.3, the Supreme Court has
already shown some reluctance to treat sexual orientation discrimination the same as other types
of discrimination when free association rights are at issue. The "moral" implications of
homosexuality seem to ensure that it could be treated differently even under comprehensive
anti-discrimination laws.
205 See supra Part II.B.1.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While local and state governments have taken steps to eradicate employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation, it is clear that a federal law is needed
to address this continuing problem in some uniform, principled manner. Attempts
to extend the protection of Title VII to cover sexual orientation have met with no
success in the courts, and equal protection analysis is similarly limited. It is clear
that federal legislation is needed to address this problem, and Congress has
proposed ENDA.
ENDA might be more politically palatable to some than an amendment to
Title VII but given the federal courts' hostility to sexual orientation claims and
the failures to extend all Title VII protections to the stand-alone protection offered
by the ADEA, it is virtually certain that the protection offered by ENDA will fall
far below that offered under Title VII. It is unclear whether theories such as
harassment and customer preference will be applied to sexual orientation
discrimination; and the numerous exceptions built into ENDA ensure that its
scope will be limited. If the intent of Congress is to protect sexual orientation like
Title VII protects race, color, sex, religion, and national origin, ENDA is not the
solution.
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